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Government Antitrust Actions and

Remedies Involving Foreign Commerce:
Procedural and Substantive
Limitations
William C. Holmes*

In recentyears, application of American antitrustlaws to activities in
foreign commerce has been a source of controversy. In this article, Mr.
Holmes addresses criticisms directedat the applicationof the antitrust laws
to commercial activities abroad,and argues that these criticisms, while not
without some merit, oftenfail to recognize the proceduraland substantive
limitations which have recently been imposed upon government agencies.
Mr. Holmes discusses these limitations at length.

Considerable controversy has arisen during recent years concerning the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws, as
implemented by the two government agencies principally responsible
for enforcing the laws: the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission. Critics argue that the threat of expansive government antitrust actions has severely undermined the ability of United States
firms to compete effectively abroad. For example, one commentator
has pointedly observed, "In markets where international trade exists or
could exist, national antitrust laws no longer make sense. If they do
anything, they only serve to hinder U.S. competitors who must live by a
code that foreign competitors can ignore."' Other critics have argued
just as vehemently that expansive applications of United States anti* Staff attorney, Federal Trade Commission; B.A., Stanford University, 1969; J.D., Harvard
Law School, 1973; member, California and Illinois Bar Associations. The opinions expressed in
this article are the author's own and should not be taken as being those of the Federal Trade
Commission or of any individual Commissioner.
I L. THUROW, THE ZERO SuM SociETY 146 (1980). See also Schwechter & Schepard, The
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trust laws have strained our nation's relationships with foreign countries, by calling into question the actions of foreign sovereigns and their
instrumentalities, and by subjecting foreign businesses to liability for
acts deemed perfectly lawful in their home territories.2
The criticisms, while certainly not without merit, largely exaggerate the true extent of the problem. Recent judicial decisions and pronouncements by the agencies themselves have placed significant
limitations upon the types of government actions that can be expected
in the international arena during the years to come. While the narrowly territorial days ofAmerican Banana Co. v. UnitedFruit Co. 3 have
not returned, the pendulum has swung at least part way back from the
expansionist period of UnitedStates v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica.4 The
result is a much more balanced approach to the initiation and prosecution of government antitrust actions involving American foreign
commerce.
This article examines some of these principal limitations, which
are both procedural and substantive in nature. Part I addresses limits
on the government's authority to assert personal jurisdiction over persons and companies operating in foreign commerce. While these limitations are concededly minimal in comparison to some of the other
restrictions that will be discussed, they nevertheless constitute potentially significant limits that should be kept clearly in mind when assessing the propriety of particular government action involving foreign
commerce.
Part II of the article examines one of the most significant limitations that has evolved during recent years-special requirements concerning subject matter jurisdiction over foreign commerce. Recent
developments in the prevailing test of subject matter jurisdiction will be
examined, particularly with respect to government antitrust actions.
Part III of the article highlights the special immunities claims that
frequently arise when jurisdiction is asserted over activities in foreign
commerce. The defenses examined include the sovereign immunity deEffects of UnitedStates Antitrust Laws on the InternationalOperationsof 4merican Firms, 1 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 492 (1979).
2 See, e.g., Hacking, The IncreasingExtraterritorialImpact of U.S. Laws: A Causefor Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. INTeL L. & Bus. 1 (1979); Note, Antitrust: British
Restrictions on Enforcement of ForeignJudgments, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 727 (1980).
3 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that United States antitrust laws do not extend to activities
conducted outside the United States). See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
4 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (United States antitrust laws do extend to activities conducted
outside the United States, if they are intended to affect American imports or exports and actually
have such an effect). See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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fense, the act of state defense, and the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense.
Part IV of the article examines the doctrine of international comity
that has taken on an expanded role in recent judicial decisions and
agency pronouncements. As will be seen, expanded interpretations of
this doctrine should come as welcome news to domestic and foreign
companies operating abroad, since the doctrine has injected much
needed flexibility into the resolution of antitrust cases involving foreign
commercial activities.
Finally, Part V of the article examines the principal substantive
limitations that the courts have placed upon the government's authority
to seek and shape the antitrust remedies appropriate for particular
cases. While many of these limitations are not unique to foreign commerce cases, it will be seen that the restrictions can take on special
significance in antitrust proceedings affecting American foreign
commerce.
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A threshold issue in assessing the validity of any government antitrust action, particularly with respect to actions involving foreign commerce, is whether proper jurisdiction has been obtained over the
defendant's person. As expressed by the Supreme Court, "one is not
bound by a judgment. . . to which he has not been made a party by
service of process."' The basic limitations on securing personal jurisdiction are two-fold, one statutory and the other constitutional.
The statutory limits on personal jurisdiction in antitrust actions
brought by the Justice Department are found in the Clayton Act, supplemented by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If the defendant is
a corporation,6 Clayton Act section 12 provides that it may be served
with process in the district in which it is an "inhabitant" or wherever
else it "may be found."7 Thus, section 12 explicitly authorizes extraterritorial service of process on corporate defendants, and the courts have
accordingly upheld service on corporations, not only at their facilities
within the United States, but even at facilities abroad.8
5 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). Note that, under
limited circumstances, jurisdiction may be asserted over the defendant's property present in the
forum state, even though jurisdiction over the defendant's person is lacking. 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1976).
6 By its terms, Clayton Act section 12 applies only to service of process on corporations.
Service on individuals and unincorporated entities follows the general requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed infra at notes 9- 1l and accompanying text.
7 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); Hoffman
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If the defendant is an individual, partnership, or corporation,9 process is served in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, particularly Rules 4(e) and 4(i).1° Taken together,
these rules authorize service "in the manner prescribed" by the appropriate long arm statutes of the state in which the court is located, or, in
the case of service in a foreign country, by personal service, by specified

registered mail service, or as prescribed by the laws of the foreign country in which service occurs. I
The statutory requirements for service of process in antitrust proceedings brought by the Federal Trade Commission are found in section 5(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' 2 Service may be made

by personally delivering a copy of the complaint to the respondent, by
leaving a copy of the complaint at the respondent's principal office or
place of business, or by mailing a copy of the complaint to the respondent by registered or certified mail.' 3 Thus, like the Clayton Act and

the Federal Rules, section 5(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
allows for extraterritorial service of process.

In addition to the statutory requirements for proper service of process, the courts have imposed significant constitutional limitations upon

personal jurisdiction under the due process clause of the Constitution.
These constitutional limitations mandate that the defendant's contacts
with the forum be such that requiring the defendant to appear in the

forum to defend itself will not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice."' 4 Procedural due process further requires that
Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Seegenerally Victor &
Hood, PersonalJurisdiction, Venue and Service ofProcess in Antitrust Cases Involving International
Trade: Amenabilit of Alien Corporationsto Suit, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1063, 1082-83 (1978).
9 While Clayton Act section 12 expressly authorizes extraterritorial service of process on corporate defendants, it does not specify the mechanics of such service. Courts, therefore, look to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance on the proper treatment of corporate as well as
non-corporate defendants.
10 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), 4(i).
I" See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976);
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977). See generally Victor & Hood, supra note 8, at 1083.
12 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (1976).
13 See, e.g., FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1311-13
(D.C. Cir. 1980), in which the District of Columbia Circuit held that the FTC cannot use registered mail service to serve an investigatory subpoena within a foreign country upon a foreign
respondent, but indicated that extraterritorial service of a complaint by registered mail would be
proper. The case is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 18-23.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 818 (1948); International
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even if sufficient "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the
forum are present, jurisdiction must be declined if the defendant has
been given inadequate "notice" of the pendency of the proceeding. 15
In making these determinations, the courts examine such factors as the
nature and substantiality of the defendant's contacts with the forum;
the extent of the defendant's contacts with the United States as a
whole,16 the connection between the contacts and the cause of action;

the availability of other forums; whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated that its activities would have an effect on American domestic or foreign commerce; and whether the method of service
used was reasonably calculated to17 inform the defendant of the nature
and pendency of the proceeding.

Not surprisingly, the constitutional requirements for personal jurisdiction constitute a more significant limitation upon government antitrust actions than do the statutory service requirements. This
conclusion is clearly illustrated by a recent decision involving an extraterritorial antitrust investigation by the Federal Trade Commission,
FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson. 8 The Commission had served an investigatory subpoena upon a foreign company by
registered mail service to the company's home office in France. While
the method used was authorized by the Commission's rules of practice,
the federal statute authorizing such rules was silent on the question of

whether such a mode of service could be employed. Looking to the
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 409 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
15 See, eg., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16 Some courts have held that when the defendant is an alien, rather than a domestic, enterprise, the relevant question becomes whether the defendant's activities established sufficient contacts with the United States "as a whole," since United States sovereignty is nationwide. See, eg.,
Cyromedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975) (jurisdiction in a patent case
found on this basis); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (jurisdiction
in a Federal Securities Act case found on this basis). Other courts consider such nationwide contacts as simply one factor to consider when determining whether it is "fair" to subject a defendant
to suit in a particular forum. See, e.g., Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G.,
432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); O.S.C. Corp. v.
Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1974); Fisons, Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d
1241, 1251 (7th Cir.), cert. dem, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 662 (D.N.H. 1977); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz.
Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See generally Victor & Hood, supra note
8, at 1076-82.
18 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance, the Court noted that the
Federal Rules draw a distinction between the service of investigatory
subpoenas (the situation involved in the case) and the service of complaints; the latter can be served by mail, thereby providing the statutory
foundation for personal jurisdiction,1 9 but the service of investigatory
subpoenas must be in person. 20 The Court concluded that Congress
intended for similar requirements to apply to the Commission and its
use of investigatory, as opposed to complaint, subpoenas.2 '
In so holding, the Court was careful to distinguish between statutory and constitutional concerns. It observed that Congress amended
the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1980 in a manner which arguably expands the modes of serving investigatory subpoenas available to
the Commission. 22 However, the Court then noted that, "even if expressly [now] authorized by statute," extraterritorial service of compulsory process by registered mail "might still be subject to a due process
attack if the witness so served. . . lacked the requisite minimum contacts with the United States. '23 What is true for the service of investigatory subpoenas would be equally true for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction; even if the statutory requirements for service of process
have been satisfied, personal jurisdiction may still be foreclosed by constitutional restrictions.2 4
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Taken literally, the antitrust laws of the United States extend the
same broad coverage to the nation's foreign commerce that applies to
its domestic commerce. Thus, the principal antitrust law enforced by
the Justice Department, the Sherman Act, broadly prohibits concerted
restraints of trade and concerted and unilateral monopolizing acts
"among the several States, or with foreign nations," without drawing
any distinction between purely domestic commercial activities and ac19 See, e.g., Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
20 FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1312-13.
21 Id at 1323.
22 The amendments authorize the Commission to serve civil investigative demands upon "any
person who is not found within the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States, in
such manner as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe for service in a foreign nation."
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 576(c)(6)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
23 FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1325.
24 See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1974) (procedural due
process precludes personal jurisdiction over a foreign company with insufficient contacts with the
United States). See also Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92
(C.D. Cal. 1971), ajldpercuriam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
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tivities abroad.'

Similarly, the major source of the Federal Trade

Commission's antitrust jurisdiction, the Federal Trade Commission
Act, broadly proscribes unfair methods of competition "among the sev-

eral States or with foreign nations," again without distinguishing between domestic and foreign trade.26
So long as the acts being challenged occurred within the United
States itself, no unique jurisdictional problems arise, since nations
clearly have jurisdiction to regulate conduct that occurs within their
own territorial limits. 27 Distinct problems arise, however, when the

challenged activities occurred principally or entirely in another country. A literal application of the nation's antitrust laws to activities

abroad that only marginally affect United States interests can place the
judiciary in a serious quandary. Foreign policy, which is properly the

province of the executive branch and not of the judiciary,2 8 can be severely undermined by such judicial action. Moreover, courts may well
find themselves in the anomolous position of rendering judgments that
are, as a practical matter, unenforceable.2 9

25 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
26 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce," while section 4 of the Act extends "commerce" to "commerce among
the several States or with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. §§ 44-45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See also section 1 of the Clayton Act, which defines "commerce" for purposes of that Act as
encompassing "commerce among the several States and with foreign nations." 15 U.S.C. § 12
(1976). While this language seemingly gives the Clayton Act the same broad reach over the nation's foreign commerce as the Sherman and FTC Acts, limiting language is contained in the
Clayton Act's specific offense provisions, effectively narrowing the scope of the Act. Thus, the
"price discrimination" provisions of the Clayton Act apply only when the prohibited transactions
involve commodities "sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States." 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1976). The "tying" and "exclusive dealing" provisions of the Clayton Act are similarly
limited to transactions involving commodities "for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976). The "mergers and acquisitions" section of the Act is somewhat
more far-reaching, extending to mergers and other acquisitions between persons engaged "in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce," where the acquisition substantially may lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any "line of commerce" or "activity affecting commerce"
in "any section" of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See also section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Act, which explicitly construes section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act as proscribing "unfair methods of competition" affecting the export trade of the United States, "even though the acts constituting such unfair methods are done
without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1976).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927); United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Ry. Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 106 (1913); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf
& W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
28 See, ag., Alfred Dunhill, Inc., v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981).
29 See, e.g., the case history of United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), discussed in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296-97
(3d Cir. 1979). After a British defendant was ordered to divest itself of certain British patents, a
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Recognizing these problems, the Supreme Court early took a quite
restrictive view of the extent to which American antitrust laws reach
foreign commercial activities. In the 1909 opinion in American Banana
Co. v. UnitedFruit Co. ,30 the Court held that the Sherman Act does not
cover activities that occur solely outside the territorial limits of the
United States. The Court reasoned:
[T]he acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the
jurisdiction of the United States .... It is surprising to hear it argued
that they were governed by the act of Congress .... [T]he general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is
done. 3'
By the mid 1940s, the pendulum had swung to the other extreme,
and courts exhibited a marked willingness to exercise jurisdiction over
activities abroad that in some way affected American domestic or foreign trade. The most extreme example of this expanded interpretation
of the reach of the nation's antitrust laws is found in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America.3 2 In relevant part, the case involved an alleged conspiracy among foreign firms to allocate world markets,
thereby inhibiting imports into the United States. The challenged conduct occurred solely outside the United States and involved only foreign companies. Nevertheless, Judge Learned Hand, writing for the
Second Circuit, held that the Sherman Act applied to this purely extraterritorial conspiracy, since the evidence established that the conspirators' acts were "intended" to affect American foreign commerce and
actually had such an "effect." 33 Judge Hand's analysis became known
as the "intended effects" test of subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
commercial activities, and was soon adopted by other lower federal
35
courts 34 and cited with apparent approval by the Supreme Court.
During recent years, the pendulum has swung once again. While
the law has not returned to the purely territorial construction of jurisdiction taken in American Banana Co., it has moved towards a more
flexible position than that taken in Aluminum Co. of America. The
British court enjoined the defendant from complying with the order, thereby effectively mooting

the order of the American court.
30 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
31 id at 355-56.
32 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (on certification from the Supreme Court for lack of a qualified

quorum).
33 Id at 443-44.

34 See, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal.
1957); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
35 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962).
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middle ground that now prevails can be traced to the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.3 6 While
Timberlane involved a private, rather than a government, antitrust lawsuit, it has had a definite impact upon the government sector, as reflected both in actual judicial holdings and in pronouncements by
agency spokesmen. Hence, the decision warrants special attention,
even in a discussion of government antitrust proceedings.
Timberlane involved an alleged conspiracy to prevent the plaintiff
from milling lumber in Honduras for export to the United States. According to the plaintiff, Bank of America had conspired with lumber
companies that it financed in Honduras to manipulate Honduran government officials into restricting the plaintiff's milling operations. The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,37 holding that the plaintiff failed to show that the claimed conspiracy had a "direct and substantial effect" on American foreign
commerce.38 The district court did not identify or consider other possibly relevant factors.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further
findings. The court reasoned that the "effects" test employed by the
lower court was "incomplete" in its failure to consider other possible
factors, including, in particular, "other nations' interests" and the "full
nature of the relationship between the actors and this country."39 The

court instructed the district court to use instead a "tripartite analysis"
that it referred to as a "jurisdictional rule of reason" standard. The first
part of the test looked for proof that the challenged activity had "some
effect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce." 4 If not,
then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
The second part of the test looked to evidence that the "effect" was
"sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury" to American commerce.4 1 If not, then dismissal of the complaint would again be called
for. The third component of the test incorporated considerations of
36 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, Antitrust Law: Extraterritorlality,21
HARV. INT. L.J. 515 (1980); Note, Antitrust Law: Extraterritoriality, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 667
(1979); Note, ManningtonMills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.: A FurtherStep Toward a Complete Subject Matter JurisdictionTest, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 241 (1980).
37 The district court also dismissed the complaint under the "act of state" doctrine, discussed

infra in text accompanying notes 55-58.
38 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976).
39

1d at 611-12.

40 Id at 613.
41 Id Similarly, the Justice Department's ANTrrRUST GUIDE requires a showing of "substantial" effect upon American foreign commerce. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTI-

Northwestern Journal of

International Law & Business

4:105(1982)

"international comity and fairness ' '42 and asked whether the "interest
of, and links to" the United States were "sufficiently large, vis-a-vis
those of other nations," to "justify an assertion of extraterritorial
43
authority.
The tripartite analysis espoused by the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane has been generally well received by courts and commentators.' Its express incorporation of international comity factors requires
courts to consider the possible international repercussions of exercising
jurisdiction over commercial activities abroad, thereby meeting the objection of those critics who argue that American antitrust laws have
been applied in an overly paternalistic manner, without regard to the
interests of other nations. At the same time, the Timberlane approach
avoids unnecessarily elaborate jurisdictional inquiries by requiring that
a "sufficiently large" effect on American domestic or foreign commerce
be shown before reaching the more difficult consideration of international comity issues.
The Timberlane "jurisdictional rule of reason" has already been
extended to a government antitrust case, even though Timberlane itself
arose in the specific context of a private lawsuit. The case, United
States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., in relevant part, involved allegations that a technology license between Westinghouse and a
Japanese firm illegally restricted Westinghouse's exportation of goods
to Japan by granting the Japanese firm exclusive manufacturing rights
in Japan. Since Westinghouse had expressly reserved the right to sell
its United States manufactured equipment in Japan, the court easily
concluded that the impact of the agreement on American exports was
too "remote" and "trivial" to be cognizable under United States antitrust laws. The court cited Timberlane as holding that United States
antitrust laws are implicated "only where the actual or intended effect
of a foreign transaction is sufficiently large to cause a cognizable injury
TRUST DIvIsION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

7 (1977) [hereinafter cited

as THE GUIDE].

42 See infra the discussion of "comity" considerations at text accompanying notes 71-86.
43 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612.
44 See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Dominicus Americana Bohio v.
Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH
No. 6, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING 5-6 (1981).

But see National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (arguing
that the Timberlane test may lead to unwarranted assertions of jurisdiction over activities that do
not have "at least some anticompetitive effects" on "American commerce, either foreign or interstate;" i.e., there must not simply be an "effect," but rather an effect which is in itself "anticompetitive." Arguably, this requirement was already implicit in Timberlane).
45 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978), afj'd, 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981).
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to United States commerce." 46
Timberlane has also been cited with apparent approval in a decision by the Federal Trade Commission. 47 In addition, spokesmen for
both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have
explicitly identified Timberlane as governing precedent. 48 While these
statements are not binding as agency policy, they presumably do reflect
current thinking at the Justice Department and the Commission. At
the very least, the statements manifest an increasing willingness on the
part of both agencies to consider not only the substantiality of the effect
that a specific practice abroad has upon United States commercial interests, but, in addition, the many other international law factors that
can influence the propriety of exercising jurisdiction in a particular
case. Thus, in the future, we can expect to see Timberlane-type thinking entering into not only the ultimate resolution of government antitrust cases, but, of perhaps even greater significance, also into the initial
selection of such cases.
III.

JURISDICTIONAL DEFENSES INVOLVING THE ACTIONS OF
FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS

Antitrust actions involving foreign commerce can directly or indirectly call into question the propriety of acts by foreign governments
and those who represent them. For example, a defendant may assert
that it is in actuality an agent or instrumentality of a foreign government; a defendant may be charged with anticompetitive behavior to
which action by a foreign governmental body was a major contributing
factor; or the defendant may seek to defend its actions as having been
compelled by the legal requirements of a foreign nation.
Three closely related judicial doctrines have evolved for handling
situations involving the actions of foreign sovereigns. The doctrines
are the sovereign immunity defense, the act of state defense, and the
Id at 542.
47 Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1265 n. 21 (1979). See also SKF Industries, 94 F.T.C. 6,
74 (1979) (approval of decision of law judge).
48 See Remarks of John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General, before the International
Law Institute and the American Bar Association's International Law Section, Washington, D.C.
(Dec. 10, 1980), reprintedin 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,424; remarks of John H. Shenefield,
Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, before the American Bar Association's International Law Section, 1978 Annual Meeting, New York City (Aug. 9, 1978), reprintedin 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) T 50,386; remarks of Commissioner Robert Pitofsky, Federal Trade Commission, before the Cleveland Bar Association's Antitrust Compliance Seminar, Cleveland, Ohio
(Apr. 28, 1981); remarks of Albert A. Foer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal
Trade Commission, before the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section, Washington, D.C.
(Apr. 1, 1981).
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foreign sovereign compulsion defense. While the applicability of each
varies, depending upon the precise nature of the sovereign's involvement in the case, the theoretical underpinning of each of the doctrines
is much the same. Each reflects a judicial reluctance to assert jurisdiction over cases that challenge the actions of foreign governments taken

on their own soil, since our nation's foreign relations can be seriously
undermined by the mere adjudication of such lawsuits. The conduct of

our foreign relations is properly the function of the executive branch,

rather than the judiciary,4 9 and the courts have accordingly declined
jurisdiction over cases that would, in effect, set foreign policy by questioning the legality of public acts by foreign sovereigns taken within the
confines of their own territorial limits.5"
The sovereign immunity doctrine applies if a foreign sovereign or
one of its agents or instrumentalities is a named defendant in the law-

suit. Under the doctrine, foreign sovereigns and those that represent
them are immune from suit in United States courts with respect to their

public governmental acts occurring within their territorial limits, but
not with respect to their commercial and purely proprietary acts.5' In
1976, Congress codified the doctrine by enacting the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act. 52 The Act grants general immunity to foreign sover-

eigns and their agents and instrumentalities from the jurisdiction of

American courts. 53 This broad grant of immunity is, however, subject
to various exceptions, of which the most important for antitrust purposes is an exception allowing suit as to the "commercial" activities of
foreign sovereigns.54
The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies only if the foreign
49 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
50 See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1981).
51 See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981);
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978); In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929). See general Note, InternationalArs'n of
Machinists v. OPEC The Demise ofthe Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity and ofthe ExtraterritorialEffect ofthe Sherman Act Against Foreign Sovereigns, 41 U. PITr. L. REV. 841 (1980);
Note, Sovereign Immunit--JurisditionalProblemsInvolving the ForeignSovereign Immunities 4ct
and ExtraterritorialApplicationof UnitedStates Antitrust Laws, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 835
(1980).
52 28 U.S.C. §§ 1300, 1602-11 (1976).
53 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
54 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). For a discussion of the meaning of the term "commercial
activities," as used in the act, see Note, Suing a Foreign Government Under the UnitedStates 4ntitrust Laws: The Need/or Clariftcationofthe CommercialActivity Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act o1976, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 657 (1979).
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sovereign is a defendant in the lawsuit, either directly or through its
agents or instrumentalities. However, where the action is against a pri-

vate party, but still calls into question the propriety of acts by a foreign
government, a closely related judicial doctrine applies-the "act of
state" doctrine. Like sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine forecloses the courts from adjudicating the legality of the public acts of

foreign nations committed on their own soil.5 Unlike sovereign immunity, however, the act of state doctrine is not a general grant of im-

munity from suit, but is instead a discretionary policy of "judicial
abstention" to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 6 The act of state
doctrine is further distinguished from sovereign immunity by the fact
that it is available to private defendants. 5 7 The doctrine may even ap-

ply to the commercial, as well as the non-commercial, actions of a foreign sovereign, if the propriety of such actions would be brought into
58
question and an affront to the foreign sovereign would thus result.
Closely related to the act of state doctrine is a further defense
available to private parties commonly referred to as the "foreign sover-

eign compulsion" defense. As applied to antitrust cases specifically,59
this doctrine shields the acts of private parties from antitrust liability if
carried out within the territorial limits of a foreign nation in obedience
to the legal requirements of the foreign government. 60 Under the doctrine, the critical inquiry is whether the legal mandates of the foreign
sovereign actually compelled the defendant to take the particular action
55 See, eg., Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, JudicialConfirmalion ofConsiderationsof Comity andInternationalRelationsin the Exercise ofExtraterritorialJurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 292, 310-14 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note,
JudicialConfirmation];Case Comment, OutboardMarine Corp. v. Pezetel, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
111, 119-21 (1980); Note, ShermanAc Jurisdictionandthe Acts ofForeignSovereigns, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 1247, 1250 (1977).
56 Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979).
57 See, eg., International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus.,
473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del.
1978); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), af'd
per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
58 International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981). But see Alfred
Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976) (portion of opinion of White, J., in which Burger,
CJ., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ. join).
59 Like the sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines, the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense is not limited to antitrust cases, but can arise in any legal action that questions the motivations or legality of acts by a foreign sovereign or those that represent it.
60 See generally Note, Judicial ContFrnation, supra note 55, at 300-01; Case Comment, supra
note 55, at 118-19; ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENT 365-67 (1975).
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challenged as being illegal under United States law, or, instead, simply
allowed such action to be taken.61 If the foreign law was obligatory,
the doctrine applies. If, however, the foreign law was merely permissive, the doctrine is inapplicable.
During recent years, these three related defenses have come to
play an increasingly important role in resolving international disputes
involving commercial activities abroad. As other nations have actively
extended their control over business activities within their territorial
limits, a mechanism has been needed to distinguish those disputes that
are properly the province of the judiciary from those that should, as a
matter of separation of powers, be handled by the executive branch.
The doctrines of sovereign immunity, act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion have provided an important mechanism to meet these
needs.
As an example, consider the following fact situation. Assume that
a foreign sovereign orders a group of oil refiners within its territorial
limits to stop selling oil to a firm engaged in the importation of oil into
the United States. Further assume that the refiners did not induce the
foreign government to issue the order, but that the discriminatory order
resulted from a falling out between the government and the terminated
buyer. Do the refiners have a valid defense under the act of state or
sovereign compulsion doctrine? On very similar facts, a court has held
that the foreign sovereign compulsion defense would apply.62 The
court reasoned, correctly it seems, that "[w]hen a nation compels a
trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts of business
become effectively acts of the sovereign."63
Strangely, the 1977 Justice Department Antitrust Guidefor International Operations' takes a much more restrictive view of this group of
defenses. One of the illustrations contained in the Guide assumes es61 See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606-08 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600, at 77,455 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
62 Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
63 Id. at 1298. See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977) (actions of the Libyan government in nationalizing the plaintiff's Libyan oil field were
governmental actions exempt from an indirect challenge under the act of state doctrine); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 447 F. Supp. 553 (D.C. Cal. 1979), aft'don other grounds, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (price fixing activities of OPEC are governmental acts exempt from
antitrust challenge under the sovereign immunity doctrine; the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the alternative ground that the activities were exempt state action).
64 THE GUIDE, supra note 41.
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sentially the same set of facts described above but concludes that
neither the act of state doctrine nor the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense would be available to the refiners in an antitrust suit,65 thereby
placing the refiners between the "rock and the hard place" of either
disobeying the foreign sovereign or risking United States antitrust liability. The restrictive position taken in the Guide is hard to reconcile
with the purpose that underlies the doctrines of sovereign immunity,
act of state, and foreign sovereign compulsion. As recently described
by the Ninth Circuit, these doctrines derive from the judiciary's concern for its "possible interference" with the "conduct of foreign affairs
by the political branches of the government. ' 66 In particular, the doctrines recognize the inappropriateness of having the judiciary, as opposed to the executive branch, "challenge the sovereignty of another
nation, the wisdom of its policy, or the integrity and motivation of its
action. ' 67 The restrictive position taken in the Justice Department's
Guide would seem to invite just such an inquiry into the "wisdom" and
"motivation" of another sovereign's actions, which properly call for application of the act of state and sovereign compulsion doctrines.
A recent letter filed by the Justice Department in the "uranium
cartel" case 68 suggests that what the Justice Department is unwilling to
do under the sovereign immunity-related defenses, it may be willing to
do under the "international comity" doctrine. 69 For the moment, it is
enough to note that the Justice Department takes the position in the
letter that defendants in a private antitrust suit should not be punished
for failing to comply with court discovery orders where their non-compliance results from foreign legislation subjecting them to criminal liability if they comply.70 While the Justice Department relied upon
comity considerations in making its recommendation, the fact situation
involved reads very much like a case of foreign sovereign compulsion.
65 Id

at 50-52.
66 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1976).
67 Id at 607. See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th
Cir. 1981).
68 Formal Statement of Interest by the United States to The Honorable Prentice H. Marshall,
United States District Court Judge, Northern District of Illinois (concerning Westinghouse, Inc. v.
Rio Algom, Ltd., No. 76 C 3830 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1980), reprintedin5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

50,416).
69 This letter is discussed in greater detail in the following section of the article, which focuses
specifically upon the doctrine of international comity. See infra notes 71-86 and accompanying
text.

70 See also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (court observed that a French company's non-compliance with an FTC investigatory
subpoena "might" be excused by a French blocking statute making it a criminal offense for the
company to comply).
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Thus, the Antitrust Guide notwithstanding, it appears that the Justice

Department remains receptive to sovereign compulsion type arguments
under the alternative framework of the comity doctrine, to which this

article now turns.
IV.

CONSIDERATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY

The courts have shown a heightened sensitivity in recent years to
the strains on international relations that can result from misplaced ap-

plication of the United States antitrust laws. This heightened concern
is reflected in expanded interpretations of the doctrine of international
comity, according to which a court may, under appropriate circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction over a dispute involving foreign
commerce even though personal and subject matter jurisdiction are
present.7 '

The traditional interpretation of the comity doctrine was relatively
narrow. The doctrine applied when two nations had jurisdiction over a
matter and their governing rules of law actually conflicted. The doctrine allowed courts, in their discretion, to resolve the conflict by refraining from exercising jurisdiction.
Basically, the test was a

"balancing" test that deferred to the law of the jurisdiction with the
most important stake in the matter, with a view to such considerations
as where the activity in question occurred and the nationalities of the
parties involved.72
Recent judicial decisions reflect a more expansive interpretation of
the doctrine. For example, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
71 See, e.g., United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976);
United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). See
generall ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 369-71 (1975); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 6, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW IN INTERNATIONAL PATENT AND
KNow-How LICENSING 7-9 (1981); and Note, Judicial Confirmation,supra note 55.
72 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965), which states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe requireinconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required by
international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
(emphasis added).
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America7 3 involved an alleged conspiracy among United States and
Honduran businesses to shut down the plaintiff's operations in Honduras through a variety of harassing tactics, thereby adversely affecting
the plaintiff's import business into the United States. While some of
74
the tactics involved the manipulation of Honduran legal proceedings,
there was "no indication of any conflict with the law or policy of the
Honduran government."7 5 Thus, a true conflict of law, triggering traditional concepts of comity, was not present. Nevertheless, the Ninth
Circuit held that the district court improperly failed to consider various
factors bearing upon the question of whether American authority
should have been asserted "as a matter of international comity and
fairness."7 6 Factors that the Court enumerated for possible considera-

tion included: (1) the existence of a difference in law or policy between
the nations affected by the dispute; (2) the nationality, locations and
principal places of business of the parties; (3) the extent to which enforcement by either nation could be expected to achieve actual compliance; (4) the relative significance of the effects of the challenged
practice on each of the nations involved; (5) the extent to which the
parties actually intended to affect American domestic or foreign commerce; (6) the forseeability of the effects on American commerce that
occurred; and (7) the relative importance to the challenged practice of
conduct within the United States itself, as opposed to conduct abroad."
The court specifically rejected a requirement that an actual conflict of
international law be demonstrated, stating that while a "difference in
law or policy is one likely sore spot," this consideration "may not always be present. '78 A similarly expansive treatment of comity-looking beyond situations in which a strict conflict of national laws is
present-can be found in other recent judicial decisions.7 9
The special importance of international comity considerations has
been recognized not only by the judiciary but by the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission. Thus, spokesmen for both
agencies have emphasized the potential importance of comity factors in
the selection and resolution of government antitrust cases involving
73 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
74 The defendants had allegedly initiated harrassing lawsuits and caused the manager of the
plaintifi's facility in Honduras to be falsely arrested. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 604-05.
75 Id at 615.
76 Id at 613.
77 Id at 614.
78 Id
79 See, eg., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-98 (3d Cir.
1979); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf& W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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foreign commerce. 8° The Justice Department's Antitrust Guidefor InternationalOperations8 similarly acknowledges that comity considerations can play an important role in determining whether United States
antitrust laws should properly be applied to particular overseas transactions. Most significantly, the Justice Department actually employed
comity arguments in a recent letter to the district court handling the
"uranium cartel" antitrust litigation. 2 In the letter, the Department
argued that on "comity" grounds, it would be "inappropriate" to punish defendants involved in the case for their "inability" to comply with
the court's discovery orders, where the inability resulted from blocking
statutes enacted by foreign countries making it a criminal offense for
the defendants to comply. 3 The Department will presumably apply
similar comity reasoning in future antitrust cases brought or considered
by the government.
The recent trend towards an expanded interpretation of concepts
of international comity should come as welcome news to domestic and
foreign companies operating abroad. Assuming that the trend continues, greater deference will be shown by the courts and government
agencies to balancing foreign policy considerations before exercising
jurisdiction over antitrust cases involving foreign commerce, even
when the challenged practices satisfy the threshold issues of personal
and subject matter jurisdiction. One important caveat should, however, be noted. Since the analysis of comity considerations is a matter
of judicial discretion, companies should not simply assume that the
courts will automatically engage in a full-blown comity inquiry. Some
courts have shown a willingness to entertain such issues on their own.84
Others, however, have concluded that an in-depth comity analysis is
not necessary if the defendant simply sits back and refuses to enter an
appearance or participate in pre-trial discovery.85 Thus, companies
that wish to raise the comity issue would be well advised, at the very
80 See supra note 48.
81 THE GUIDE, supra note 41, at 6-7, 51-52.
82 Formal Statement of Interest by the United States to The Honorable Prentice H. Marshall,
supra note 68, reprintedin 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,416.
83 See also FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). The court suggested that a foreign company's refusal to comply with an investigatory
subpoena "might" be excused by a foreign blocking statute making it a criminal offense for the
company to comply. The court reasoned that "[pirinciples of international comity require that
domestic courts not take action that may cause the violation of another nation's laws." Id at 1327
n. 150.
84 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
85 See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
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least, to enter a special appearance to contest the discretionary exercise
of jurisdiction on comity grounds.86
V.

LIMITATIONS UPON THE GOVERNMENT'S REMEDIAL POWERS
RESPECTING FOREIGN COMMERCE

This article has thus far examined the various threshold requirements that must be met before the government can properly initiate an

antitrust action against activities in foreign commerce. One must now
consider other factors that bear directly upon the propriety of the par-

ticular antitrust relief imposed. The remedial powers of the government are extremely far-reaching in their potential application to
foreign, as well as domestic, commerce. The Sherman Act expressly
empowers the Justice Department to enforce the Act through criminal
sanctions, or through equitable proceedings to enjoin or otherwise pro-

hibit violations of the Act.87 The remedial powers of the Federal Trade
Commission are likewise expansive, authorizing the Commission to is-

sue cease-and-desist orders prohibiting violations of the various laws
administered by the Commission."
In applying these remedial powers, the focus is upon achieving
that relief which will be "effective to redress the violations" and "restore competition."8 9 Appropriate relief can go far beyond simply for-

bidding a repetition of the specific illegal conduct in question, and can
consist of such broader structural remedies as the divestiture of assets, 90

86 For an example of a special appearance by a foreign corporation to contest jurisdiction, see
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 109-12 (1969).
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1976). See also Clayton Act section 15, empowering the Justice Department to initiate equitable proceedings to prevent violations of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 25
(1976).
88 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. IV 1980); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21(b) (1976); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1976).
Note that an early Supreme Court decision indicated that the remedial powers of the Federal
Trade Commission are much more circumscribed than those of the Justice Department. FTC v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927) (the Commission did not have the power to order divestiture as relief in a monopolization case brought under section 5 of the FTC Act). This early
restrictive position has since been rejected by the Supreme Court and lower courts. See, e.g., FTC
v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 296, 311-13 (1963); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Golden
Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 178 (1971), modfed, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 918 (1973); In re Ekco Products Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1213-14 (1964), aft'd, 347 F.2d 745
(7th Cir. 1965). See generaly 2 P. AREEDA & 0. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 305(e) (1978); S.
KANwr, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 15.05 (1979).
89 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961). See also Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573 (1972).
90 See, eg., Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128 (1948); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
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compulsory licensing of technology, 9' or a compulsory duty to deal in
the sale or purchase of materials.9 2 These and other equally drastic
antitrust remedies have been upheld, where necessary, 93to redress the
proven law violations and restore effective competition.
The government's remedial powers in antitrust cases are not, however, without limitations. It must first be demonstrated that the particular relief selected is "necessary" to effectively terminate the proven
law violations and restore competition.9 4 The necessity of particular
relief will vary from case to case, depending upon such variables as the
structure of the industry, the barriers to entry within the industry, the
relative competitive position of the defendants vis-a-vis aqtual and potential competitors, and the competitive consequences of the specific
law violations.95 Thus, the relief appropriate and necessary for one
case need not be appropriate in even closely similar cases, depending
upon precisely what is shown to be necessary to rectify the effects on

competition of the particular law violations.
The requirement of "necessity" is illustrated by one of the leading
cases on antitrust violations involving foreign commerce, United States
v. NationalLead Co.96 National Lead and duPont had conspired with
the leading foreign producers of titanium pigments to allocate world
91 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 338 (1947); Charles Pfizer & Co.
v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1972); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 579
(1966).
93 See generally Holmes, Compulsory Patentand TrademarkLicensing: A Framework/orAnalysis, 12 Loy. U. CHi. L. J. 43, 44-46 (1980); 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 88, § 305(e).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 64 (1973); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1968); Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 806 (1978); In
re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 473 (1972), aft'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
Note that a different standard than that of "necessity" applies to judicial review of an antitrust order of the Federal Trade Commission, due to the Commission's status as an administrative
agency. The courts will defer to the expertise and discretion of the Commission, so long as the
relief imposed bears a "reasonable relationship" to the proven law violations and is confined to
the "least drastic" alternative. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95
(1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d
1, 23 (7th Cir. 1971); Niresk Indus. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883
(1960).
95 See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (reasonable-royalty licensing of patents upheld, where necessary to enable competitors to compete more effectively;
royalty-free patent licensing and divestiture of plants denied, where some existing competitors
were already in the market and capable of paying a royalty); United States v. General Elec. Co.,
115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953) (public dedication of patents imposed, where it appeared that
prospective competitors would be unable to afford to pay royalties).
96 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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titanium pigment markets through the guise of pooled patent licenses.
The conspiracy had quite effectively restricted domestic imports and
exports, giving National Lead and duPont control over an estimated
ninety percent of the domestic market. This control was not complete,
however, for the domestic industry also included two other smaller but
competitively vigorous producers not privy to the conspiracy.
Faced with these facts, the Supreme Court upheld antitrust relief
requiring National Lead and duPont to license existing and certain future patents to competitors on a reasonable-royalty basis. The Court
concluded that this relief was essential to improve competitive conditions within the industry since, when "added together," the patent control given to National Lead and duPont by the conspiracy gave them
97
effective "domination and control" over the United States industry.
The Court declined, however, to require royalty-free patent licensing,
as requested by the Justice Department. Since the evidence indicated
that the existing domestic competitors not privy to the conspiracy could
afford to pay reasonable royalties, the Court concluded that the Justice
Department had failed to prove that the more drastic form of licensing
was "necessary" to "enforce effectively the Antitrust Act." 98
Closely related to the requirement of necessity is the further limitation that the relief imposed be confined to the "least drastic" alternative remedy that will effectively offset the proven law violations. 9 9 If
the same remedial objective can be achieved through a less drastic alternative remedy, the alternative relief must be employed. An illustrative case is Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States," which
involved a conspiracy to allocate world markets between Timken
Roller Bearing Company and British and French firms in which
Timken had a financial interest. The district court had not only enjoined repetitions of the specific conduct found illegal, but had further
ordered Timken to divest itself of its stockholdings in the British and
French firms."0 ' A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the
divestiture relief went too far, and, accordingly, struck the divestiture
requirement from the order.10 2 Concurring, Justice Reed explained
97 Id at 327.
98 Id at 349.
99 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 (1951) (Reed, J.
and Black, C.J., concurring); Jacob Seigel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946); HartfordEmpire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,424-26 (1945); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212,

217 (1933).
100 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
101 Id at 600.
102 Id at 601.
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that harsh remedies such as divestiture are "not to be used indiscriminately, without regard to . . . whether other effective methods, less
harsh, are available."' 3 Justice Reed concluded that the absence of
evidence of a "propensity toward restraint of trade" on the part of the
defendants made complete divestiture overly harsh, and that the defendants' future compliance with the antitrust laws would be adequately assured by the threat of civil or criminal contempt proceedings
if they violated the remaining injunctive provisions of the order." 0
A third limitation applicable to civil antitrust actions is that the
relief imposed must be for truly remedial purposes and must not be
imposed as "punishment" for violating the law. Punishment as relief is
appropriate only if the case is a criminal action brought by the Justice
Department, and is'not appropriate in civil proceedings by the Justice
Department or before the Federal Trade Commission. The non-punitive nature of civil antitrust remedies is stressed in several leading judicial decisions. For example, in Timken Roller Bearing Co., Justice
Reed additionally observed that "divestiture is a remedy to restore
competition and not to punish those who restrain trade."' 1 5 Similarly,
in NationalLead Co., the Court noted that the case was a "civil, not a
criminal" proceeding and, hence, that the "purpose0 6of the decree" was
"effective and fair enforcement, not punishment."1
Antitrust remedies involving foreign commerce entail a further
limiting factor unique to these types of cases. When shaping the antitrust relief appropriate for a case in foreign, as opposed to domestic,
commerce, consideration may well have to be given to international
"comity" concerns comparable to those bearing upon the exercise of
jurisdiction.0 7 Relevant variables can include such comity concerns as
the nationality of the various defendants, the location of their principal
operations, the extent of their involvement in the proven law violations,
the applicable legal standards of other concerned countries, and the
likelihood that particular order provisions will actually be
enforceable. 'o8

A case that compellingly illustrates the possible hazards of failing
103 Id at 603 (Reed, J. and Black, C.J., concurring).
104 Id at 603-04 (Reed, J. and Black, C.J., concurring).
105 Id at 603 (Reed, J. and Black, C.J., concurring).
106 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 338 (1947). See also United States v. E.I.

duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323
U.S. 386, 409 (1945); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 432 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 351 (D. Mass. 1953).
107 See, e.g., Remarks of John H. Shenefield, supra note 48, reprinted in 5 TRADa REG. REP.
(CCH) 150,424.
108 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 852 (D.N.J. 1953).
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to consider international comity factors when shaping antitrust remedies involving foreign commerce is United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries.1 9 The case involved a Justice Department proceeding
against a British company, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), and duPont for conspiring with other domestic and foreign firms to allocate
world firearms and explosives markets. As part of the remedy, the British defendant, ICI, was ordered to divest itself of certain foreign patents that were involved in implementation of the conspiracy. 110
However, ICI had already contracted to grant an exclusive license
under the patents to another British firm. At the request of the other
British firm, a court in England ordered ICI not to divest the patents,
but, instead, to abide by the licensing agreement."' Thus, the English
court quite effectively negated the divestiture remedy contained in the
American court's decree.
The lesson of Imperial ChemicalIndustries was apparently not lost
on the courts. In United States v. GeneralElectric Co. ,12 another court
was confronted with the similar problem of shaping appropriate antitrust relief for a foreign defendant. A Dutch company, Philips, had
conspired with General Electric and other firms to allocate world incandescent lamp markets, largely through a network of patent licenses
and cross-licenses." l3 Philips neither manufactured lamps in the
United States, nor imported them into the country. Furthermore, while
its behavior was illegal under United States antitrust law, it was not
illegal under Dutch law." 4 Finally, the United States patents that it
held, and that were involved in the illegal patent cross-licensing

scheme, were merely ancillary to its foreign patents.' 11
The court ordered Philips to publicly dedicate the misused United
States lamp patents, reasoning that absent such relief, the patents
would thwart the entry of new competition, thereby perpetuating the
prior illegal market allocation. 1' 6 The court declined, however, to order Philips to refrain from enforcing its matching foreign patents
against exporters of products produced under the licensed United
109 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
110 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (supplemental

decision on remedies).
111 British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 69 Pat. Cas. 288 (1952).
112 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953) (relief decision).
113 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949) (violation decision).
114 Id at 890.
115 United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 851 (D.N.J. 1953).
116 Id at 843-49.
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States patents, a remedy which the Justice Department sought.
The court's reasoning on the issue of matching foreign patents is
especially illuminating. The court-noted that Philips' contribution to
the conspiracy principally involved its United States patents, with its

foreign patents being merely ancillary." 8 From this, the court concluded that the least drastic remedial alternative that would still
counteract the effects of Philips' misconduct consisted simply of the ordered dedication and licensing of the United States patents, rendering
further restrictions on the matching foreign patents unnecessary and
inappropriate.' '9 Not stopping here, the court further emphasized several "comity" considerations to justify its holding, noting that Philips
was not a United States citizen, did not manufacture or import goods
within the United States, and operated in areas of the world "where
different standards of industrial behavior prevail than are acceptable in
this country."' 2 0 The court accordingly rejected the foreign patent relief sought by the Justice Department, applying what amounted to an
analysis analogous to that applied in recent ju"international comity"
2
risdictional cases.' '
VI.

CONCLUSION

Government antitrust actions involving foreign commerce have
been the source of considerable controversy during recent years. Critics have argued that overly expansive and paternalistic applications of
American antitrust laws to commercial activities abroad have both undermined the ability of United States firms to compete effectively in
foreign markets, and strained our nation's relationships with foreign
sovereigns.
While the criticisms are certainly not without merit, they often fail
to recognize that significant procedural and substantive limitations
have been placed upon the government agencies during recent years,
restricting the types of foreign commerce antitrust cases and remedies
that can be expected in the future. Some of these restrictions have been
mandated by judicial decisions. Others have been adopted by the
agencies themselves. Many of the criticisms are, thus, directed at an
historical problem that has already been largely rectified.
at 852. The court did impose such a restriction on General Electric and the other
States
defendants. Id. at 851.
United
118 Id at 852.
117 Id

19 Id
120 Id

121 Id at 851-52.
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This article has examined some of the principal limitations on antitrust remedies, including, in particular: statutory and constitutional
limits on personal jurisdiction; apparent Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission approval of the "jurisdictional rule of reason"
approach to subject matter jurisdiction; recent developments in the various sovereign immunity-related defenses, particularly with respect to
the act of state and foreign sovereign compulsion doctrines; and apparent agency acceptance of the Timberlane-ManningtonMills framework
for assessing "international comity" issues. The article has additionally
examined key factors that bear upon the propriety of antitrust remedies
directed at foreign commerce, especially concerns of "international
comity" analogous to those highlighted in recent decisions and agency
pronouncements concerning the exercise of jurisdiction.

